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Zachary Feinstein

Publications and source records attributed to Zachary Feinstein.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

Scalar multivariate risk measures with a single eligible asset

In this paper we present results on scalar risk measures in markets with transaction costs. Such risk measures are defined as the minimal capital requirements in the cash asset. First, some results are provided on the dual representation of such risk measures, with particular emphasis given on the space of dual variables as (equivalent) martingale measures and prices consistent with the market model. Then, these dual representations are used to obtain the main results of this paper on time consistency for scalar risk measures in markets with frictions. It is well known from the superhedging risk measure in markets with transaction costs, as in Jouini and Kallal (1995), Roux and Zastawniak (2016), and Loehne and Rudloff (2014), that the usual scalar concept of time consistency is too strong and not satisfied. We will show that a weaker notion of time consistency can be defined, which corresponds to the usual scalar time consistency but under any fixed consistent pricing process. We will prove the equivalence of this weaker notion of time consistency and a certain type of backward recursion with respect to the underlying risk measure with a fixed consistent pricing process. Several examples are given, with special emphasis on the superhedging risk measure.

q-fin.RM↗

Set-Valued Risk Measures as Backward Stochastic Difference Inclusions and Equations

Scalar dynamic risk measures for univariate positions in continuous time are commonly represented as backward stochastic differential equations. In the multivariate setting, dynamic risk measures have been defined and studied as families of set-valued functionals in the recent literature. There are two possible extensions of scalar backward stochastic differential equations for the set-valued framework: (1) backward stochastic differential inclusions, which evaluate the risk dynamics on the selectors of acceptable capital allocations; or (2) set-valued backward stochastic differential equations, which evaluate the risk dynamics on the full set of acceptable capital allocations as a singular object. In this work, the discrete time setting is investigated with difference inclusions and difference equations in order to provide insights for such differential representations for set-valued dynamic risk measures in continuous time.

q-fin.RM↗

Dynamic Set Values for Nonzero Sum Games with Multiple Equilibriums

Nonzero sum games typically have multiple Nash equilibriums (or no equilibrium), and unlike the zero sum case, they may have different values at different equilibriums. Instead of focusing on the existence of individual equilibriums, we study the set of values over all equilibriums, which we call the set value of the game. The set value is unique by nature and always exists (with possible value $\emptyset$). Similar to the standard value function in control literature, it enjoys many nice properties such as regularity, stability, and more importantly the dynamic programming principle. There are two main features in order to obtain the dynamic programming principle: (i) we must use closed-loop controls (instead of open-loop controls); (ii) we must allow for path dependent controls, even if the problem is in a state dependent (Markovian) setting. We shall consider both discrete and continuous time models with finite time horizon. For the latter we will also provide a duality approach through certain standard PDE (or path dependent PDE), which is quite efficient for numerically computing the set value of the game.

math.OC↗

Continuity and sensitivity analysis of parameterized Nash games

In this paper we consider continuity of the set of Nash equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria for parameterized games. For parameterized games with unique Nash equilibria, the continuity of this equilibrium mapping is well-known. However, when the equilibria need not be unique, there may exist discontinuities in the equilibrium mapping. The focus of this work is to summarize continuity properties for parameterized Nash equilibria and prove continuity via the approximate Nash game with uniformly continuous objective functions over potentially non-compact strategy spaces.

math.OC↗

Reanimating a Dead Economy: Financial and Economic Analysis of a Zombie Outbreak

In this paper, we study the financial and economic implications of a zombie epidemic on a major industrialized nation. We begin with a consideration of the epidemiological modeling of the zombie contagion. The emphasis of this work is on the computation of direct and indirect financial consequences of this contagion of the walking dead. A moderate zombie outbreak leaving 1 million people dead in a major industrialized nation could result in GDP losses of 23.44% over the subsequent year and a drop in financial market of 29.30%. We conclude by recommending policy actions necessary to prevent this potential economic collapse.

q-fin.GN↗

A Dynamic Default Contagion Model: From Eisenberg-Noe to the Mean Field

In this work we introduce a model of default contagion that combines the approaches of Eisenberg-Noe interbank networks and dynamic mean field interactions. The proposed contagion mechanism provides an endogenous rule for early defaults in a network of financial institutions. The main result is to demonstrate a mean field interaction that can be found as the limit of the finite bank system generated from a finite Eisenberg-Noe style network. In this way, we connect two previously disparate frameworks for systemic risk, and in turn we provide a bridge for exploiting recent advances in mean field analysis when modelling systemic risk. The mean field limit is shown to be well-posed and is identified as a certain conditional McKean-Vlasov type problem that respects the original network topology under suitable assumptions.

q-fin.MF↗

Capital Regulation under Price Impacts and Dynamic Financial Contagion

We construct a continuous time model for price-mediated contagion precipitated by a common exogenous stress to the banking book of all firms in the financial system. In this setting, firms are constrained so as to satisfy a risk-weight based capital ratio requirement. We use this model to find analytical bounds on the risk-weights for assets as a function of the market liquidity. Under these appropriate risk-weights, we find existence and uniqueness for the joint system of firm behavior and the asset prices. We further consider an analytical bound on the firm liquidations, which allows us to construct exact formulas for stress testing the financial system with deterministic or random stresses. Numerical case studies are provided to demonstrate various implications of this model and analytical bounds.

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Obligations with Physical Delivery in a Multi-Layered Financial Network

This paper provides a general framework for modeling financial contagion in a system with obligations in multiple illiquid assets (e.g., currencies). In so doing, we develop a multi-layered financial network that extends the single network of Eisenberg and Noe (2001). In particular, we develop a financial contagion model with fire sales that allows institutions to both buy and sell assets to cover their liabilities in the different assets and act as utility maximizers. We prove that, under standard assumptions and without market impacts, equilibrium portfolio holdings exist and are unique. However, with market impacts, we prove that equilibrium portfolio holdings and market prices exist which clear the multi-layered financial system. In general, though, these clearing solutions are not unique. We extend this result by considering the tâtonnement process to find the unique attained equilibrium. The attained equilibrium need not be continuous with respect to the initial shock; these points of discontinuity match those stresses in which a financial crisis becomes a systemic crisis. We further provide mathematical formulations for payment rules and utility functions satisfying the necessary conditions for these existence and uniqueness results. We demonstrate the value of our model through illustrative numerical case studies. In particular, we study a counterfactual scenario on the event that Greece re-instituted the drachma on a dataset from the European Banking Authority.

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Impact of Contingent Payments on Systemic Risk in Financial Networks

In this paper we study the implications of contingent payments on the clearing wealth in a network model of financial contagion. We consider an extension of the Eisenberg-Noe financial contagion model in which the nominal interbank obligations depend on the wealth of the firms in the network. We first consider the problem in a static framework and develop conditions for existence and uniqueness of solutions as long as no firm is speculating on the failure of other firms. In order to achieve existence and uniqueness under more general conditions, we introduce a dynamic framework. We demonstrate how this dynamic framework can be applied to problems that were ill-defined in the static framework.

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Sensitivity of the Eisenberg-Noe clearing vector to individual interbank liabilities

We quantify the sensitivity of the Eisenberg-Noe clearing vector to estimation errors in the bilateral liabilities of a financial system in a stylized setting. The interbank liabilities matrix is a crucial input to the computation of the clearing vector. However, in practice central bankers and regulators must often estimate this matrix because complete information on bilateral liabilities is rarely available. As a result, the clearing vector may suffer from estimation errors in the liabilities matrix. We quantify the clearing vector's sensitivity to such estimation errors and show that its directional derivatives are, like the clearing vector itself, solutions of fixed point equations. We describe estimation errors utilizing a basis for the space of matrices representing permissible perturbations and derive analytical solutions to the maximal deviations of the Eisenberg-Noe clearing vector. This allows us to compute upper bounds for the worst case perturbations of the clearing vector in our simple setting. Moreover, we quantify the probability of observing clearing vector deviations of a certain magnitude, for uniformly or normally distributed errors in the relative liability matrix. Applying our methodology to a dataset of European banks, we find that perturbations to the relative liabilities can result in economically sizeable differences that could lead to an underestimation of the risk of contagion. Our results are a first step towards allowing regulators to quantify errors in their simulations.

q-fin.MF↗

Optimization of Fire Sales and Borrowing in Systemic Risk

This paper provides a framework for modeling financial contagion in a network subject to fire sales and price impacts, but allowing for firms to borrow to cover their shortfall as well. We consider both uncollateralized and collateralized loans. The main results of this work are providing sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the clearing solutions (i.e., payments, liquidations, and borrowing); in such a setting any clearing solution is the Nash equilibrium of an aggregation game.

q-fin.MF↗

A Supermartingale Relation for Multivariate Risk Measures

The equivalence between multiportfolio time consistency of a dynamic multivariate risk measure and a supermartingale property is proven. Furthermore, the dual variables under which this set-valued supermartingale is a martingale are characterized as the worst-case dual variables in the dual representation of the risk measure. Examples of multivariate risk measures satisfying the supermartingale property are given. Crucial for obtaining the results are dual representations of scalarizations of set-valued dynamic risk measures, which are of independent interest in the fast growing literature on multivariate risks.

q-fin.RM↗

Harry Potter and the Goblin Bank of Gringotts

Gringotts Wizarding Bank is well known as the only financial institution in all of the Wizarding UK as documented in the works recounting the heroics of Harry Potter. The concentration of power and wealth in this single bank needs to be weighed against the financial stability of the entire Wizarding economy. This study will consider the impact to financial risk of breaking up Gringotts Wizarding Bank into five component pieces, along the lines of the Glass-Steagall Act in the United States. The emphasis of this work is to calibrate and simulate a model of the banking and financial systems within Wizarding UK under varying stress test scenarios simulating rumors of Lord Voldemort's return or the release of magical creatures into an unsuspecting muggle populace. We conclude by comparing the economic fallout from financial crises under the two systems: (i) Gringotts Wizarding Bank as a monopoly and (ii) the split-up financial system. We do this comparison on the level of minimal system-wide capital injections that would be needed to prevent the financial crisis from surpassing the damage caused by Lord Voldemort.

q-fin.GN↗

Financial Contagion and Asset Liquidation Strategies

This paper provides a framework for modeling the financial system with multiple illiquid assets during a crisis. This work generalizes the paper by Amini, Filipovic and Minca (2016) by allowing for differing liquidation strategies. The main result is a proof of sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium liquidation strategy with corresponding unique clearing payments and liquidation prices. An algorithm for computing the maximal clearing payments and prices is provided.

q-fin.RM↗

The Effects of Leverage Requirements and Fire Sales on Financial Contagion via Asset Liquidation Strategies in Financial Networks

This paper provides a framework for modeling the financial system with multiple illiquid assets when liquidation of illiquid assets is caused by failure to meet a leverage requirement. This extends the network model of Cifuentes, Shin & Ferrucci (2005) which incorporates a single asset with fire sales and capital adequacy ratio. This also extends the network model of Feinstein (2015) which incorporates multiple illiquid assets with fire sales and no leverage ratios. We prove existence of equilibrium clearing payments and liquidation prices for a known liquidation strategy when leverage requirements are required. We also prove sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium liquidation strategy with corresponding clearing payments and liquidation prices. Finally we calibrate network models to asset and liability data for 50 banks in the United States from 2007-2014 in order to draw conclusions on systemic risk as a function of leverage requirements.

q-fin.RM↗

Measures of Systemic Risk

Systemic risk refers to the risk that the financial system is susceptible to failures due to the characteristics of the system itself. The tremendous cost of systemic risk requires the design and implementation of tools for the efficient macroprudential regulation of financial institutions. The current paper proposes a novel approach to measuring systemic risk. Key to our construction is a rigorous derivation of systemic risk measures from the structure of the underlying system and the objectives of a financial regulator. The suggested systemic risk measures express systemic risk in terms of capital endowments of the financial firms. Their definition requires two ingredients: a cash flow or value model that assigns to the capital allocations of the entities in the system a relevant stochastic outcome; and an acceptability criterion, i.e. a set of random outcomes that are acceptable to a regulatory authority. Systemic risk is measured by the set of allocations of additional capital that lead to acceptable outcomes. We explain the conceptual framework and the definition of systemic risk measures, provide an algorithm for their computation, and illustrate their application in numerical case studies. Many systemic risk measures in the literature can be viewed as the minimal amount of capital that is needed to make the system acceptable after aggregating individual risks, hence quantify the costs of a bail-out. In contrast, our approach emphasizes operational systemic risk measures that include both ex post bailout costs as well as ex ante capital requirements and may be used to prevent systemic crises.

q-fin.RM↗

A recursive algorithm for multivariate risk measures and a set-valued Bellman's principle

A method for calculating multi-portfolio time consistent multivariate risk measures in discrete time is presented. Market models for $d$ assets with transaction costs or illiquidity and possible trading constraints are considered on a finite probability space. The set of capital requirements at each time and state is calculated recursively backwards in time along the event tree. We motivate why the proposed procedure can be seen as a set-valued Bellman's principle, that might be of independent interest within the growing field of set optimization. We give conditions under which the backwards calculation of the sets reduces to solving a sequence of linear, respectively convex vector optimization problems. Numerical examples are given and include superhedging under illiquidity, the set-valued entropic risk measure, and the multi-portfolio time consistent version of the relaxed worst case risk measure and of the set-valued average value at risk.

q-fin.RM↗

It's a Trap: Emperor Palpatine's Poison Pill

In this paper we study the financial repercussions of the destruction of two fully armed and operational moon-sized battle stations ("Death Stars") in a 4-year period and the dissolution of the galactic government in Star Wars. The emphasis of this work is to calibrate and simulate a model of the banking and financial systems within the galaxy. Along these lines, we measure the level of systemic risk that may have been generated by the death of Emperor Palpatine and the destruction of the second Death Star. We conclude by finding the economic resources the Rebel Alliance would need to have in reserve in order to prevent a financial crisis from gripping the galaxy through an optimally allocated banking bailout.

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