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cs.CR: explore 594 source-linked works published from 2022 to 2026, with original documents and citations.

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Includes records with this source-supplied label or an explicit phrase match in their metadata. Matches indicate a mention, not proof that a paper uses a method or tests a material. Source versions are consolidated by DOI.

Sources: arxiv. Collection updated 2026-09-16. Counts describe this index, not the complete source archives.

Auditing and Mitigating Privacy Leakage in Cloud-Edge Collaborative Decoding

Applications such as personalized assistance and proprietary document analysis require large language models (LLMs) to generate outputs from private data. Yet powerful LLMs typically cannot be deployed on the resource-constrained devices where private data resides, and uploading private data to cloud-hosted LLMs exposes sensitive information. Recent work addresses this tension with a cloud-edge collaborative decoding paradigm, where private data are kept on the edge with a small language model (SLM) producing next-token distributions, which are fused with predictions from a cloud LLM operating solely on public data. In this paper, we systematically analyze the privacy risks of such a paradigm with a novel evaluation framework using constructed QA datasets, which show that such collaboration can expose substantial private-context information. To address such privacy leakage, we propose CoVeil, a defense mechanism which dynamically optimizes transmitted signals to suppress leakage during decoding time while preserving the collaborative quality. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that CoVeil consistently improves the privacy-utility trade-off over existing baselines by reducing data leakage by up to 87.2%, with minimal accuracy loss.

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Not the Same Protector: Deployment-Dependent Protective Intervention in LLMs

We ask whether a model protects a user in the same way when that user speaks rather than types. Using a single distress vignette---a physical injury of unstated severity following an interpersonal conflict---we present four frontier models with matched inputs across voice, text, and raw API deployment conditions (n=30 per cell) and code each response along five binary protective indicators, including whether the model issues an explicit medical-care directive. Voice-interface responses are markedly shorter than text-interface responses for three of the four models, and protective behavior contracts alongside that compression: medical directives are at ceiling under both the API and text conditions but decline under voice for every model tested. The contraction is not reducible to length. One model produces voice and text responses of comparable length yet still drops medical directives, and another falls below ceiling between its API and voice conditions, whose responses are of nearly identical length. Under raw API access the pattern is categorical rather than partial: no model asks after the user's safety even once. These results show that protective intervention is sensitive to the surface through which a request arrives, that this sensitivity is detectable using a simple protective coding scheme, and that it is not explained by turn length alone.

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WoE Wrote It? Watermarking Mixture-of-Experts LLMs for Black-Box Text Provenance

Large Language Model (LLM) watermarks provide a mechanism for text provenance, enabling model owners to identify machine-generated content and attribute it to a specific watermarked model. However, current LLM watermarking approaches predominantly rely on inference-time sampler methods and focus their analysis on dense models. Inference-time methods are only effective when the text is explicitly generated via the model owner's controlled API; they fail in a post-compromise scenario. An adversary who steals or leaks the model weights gains complete control over inference and can simply run an unmodified sampler, bypassing the watermark and preventing post-theft attribution. In this work, we introduce Watermarking of Experts (WoE), a novel black-box text provenance method that leverages the unique structural properties of sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models. WoE biases the vocabulary of specific experts and shifts the watermark signal embedding away from unenforceable inference wrappers. This approach ensures the watermark remains intrinsic to the model parameters, enabling defenders to attribute text generated by stolen weights, leaked checkpoints, and secondary dense models distilled from the stolen architecture without needing access to the adversary's deployment or weights. We evaluate WoE across eight MoE models, demonstrating successful watermark detection from suspect text, achieving an average true positive rate of 90.1% at a 1% false positive rate, reaching up to 94.9%, while largely preserving general model utility. Furthermore, WoE remains detectable under adversarial supervised fine-tuning, model extraction, and output-level paraphrasing, forcing malicious actors into a trade-off in which weakening the attribution signal requires additional model adaptation or text-rewriting operations, or compromises the utility of the resulting output.

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GhostSplat: Input-Triggered Backdoors for Multi-View-Consistent 3D Content Manipulation in Feed-Forward Gaussian Splatting

Feed-forward 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) reconstructs a 3D scene from sparse images in one forward pass. Its shared pretrained weights also expose a supply-chain attack surface. Existing Neural Radiance Field and 3DGS backdoors modify individual scenes and activate at selected viewpoints; they do not install persistent behavior in shared generator weights. We introduce GhostSplat, an input-triggered backdoor that installs such behavior in feed-forward 3DGS. A low-amplitude pattern added to the input images causes the poisoned generator to render an attacker-chosen payload on unseen victim scenes. Anchoring the payload to a 3D point and reprojecting it into each target view makes the payload multi-view consistent. Exact projection onto the generator's representation-specific consistency set leaves a realized payload unchanged because the output already belongs to that set. The GhostSplat training framework succeeds across three architectures (MVSplat, pixelSplat, DepthSplat) and two datasets (RealEstate10K, ACID). Its strongest evaluated injection and deletion settings reach 96% and 100% ASR, respectively, with zero observed false positives while surviving JPEG, blur, and resampling. Defenses that use only that exact projection are therefore insufficient; effective mitigation requires information or intervention beyond same-set consistency projection.

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A Broadcast Authenticated Encryption with Keyword Search in the Standard Model: Tightly Secure in Multi-User, Multi-Challenge Settings

However, no known work considered the functionality requirement in its most realistic setting. We propose a new security definition of BAEKS in the multi-user (with adaptive corruptions) and multi-challenge (both in terms of ciphertext and trapdoor in an interleaved manner) settings. We also study the question of the unforgeability of BAEKS. In fact, our strong hiding requirement already implies a significant amount of unforgeability. We then propose a new BAEKS construction in the bilinear pairing groups. We prove this scheme achieves adaptive tight full-hiding security under (almost) standard MDDH assumptions. Restricting our BAEKS construction for a single receiver also gives an efficient and tightly secure PAEKS construction. We further run experiments to implement and evaluate our scheme.

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Asymmetric Phase Coding Video Watermarking

Existing video watermarking systems are symmetric: the party that can verify a mark holds the extractor weights or generator secret and can therefore also embed one. Benchmarks confirm the consequence, reporting that white-box forgery defeats all evaluated methods. We present a training-free video watermark that removes the shared secret. The signer embeds a complete Ed25519 signature into the phase spectrum of the chroma plane; any party holding the 32-byte public key and public per-video metadata verifies offline, with no model, no registry, and no network. The payload, 1024 bits of signed message with error correction, is an order of magnitude above common learned payloads and is carried by three design elements: a run-length temporal layout whose decoder identifies payload groups by correlation and never reads a frame index, a payload-free search that recovers scale, rotation, and translation from the carrier itself, and a closed-loop signing procedure that selects each video's embedding strength by self-verification through the unchanged public verifier. On 1000 uncurated real-world clips the system ships a verifying signature for 99.3% of the corpus and accepts a wrong public key zero times in 1000 attempts. An attack-aware acceptance gate yields embeddings that survive H.264 re-encoding at 100% and 50% rescaling at 97.4% on gated clips. The signature also verifies through a real display and capture loop, an axis absent from published evaluations.

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A Multi-Month Study of Git Commit Signing

Git commit signing, introduced in 2012, is one mechanism for establishing commit provenance in software supply chains, yet developer-controlled adoption remains rare and developers' experiences using it are understudied. To examine this experience, we conducted a three-month study with senior undergraduate and graduate computer science students (n = 22), whom we treat as proxies for junior developers. Participants configured commit signing independently, used it across four coursework projects, extended it to a second device, examined an external repository containing anomalous commits, and answered security-reasoning prompts. We found that while almost all participants successfully signed every commit and rated routine signing positively, many faced friction during setup, multi-device configuration, and repository verification. Despite signing all semester, they struggled to spot anomalous commits during verification, with over a quarter finding none. Additionally, nearly half expressed at least one misconception regarding signing guarantees or key management. Without isolating whether these difficulties stemmed from tooling, education, or understanding, we conclude that making signing easier is not enough to ensure effective security use. Rather, secure adoption also requires tools and education that support signature verification against authorized identities, interpretation of missing signatures and unknown keys, and correct reasoning about key-lifecycle operations.

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Unlearning on Spatio-Temporal Graphs through Subgraph Virtual Edge Reconstruction

Spatio-temporal graphs are widely used in modeling complex dynamic processes such as temporal forecasting, molecular dynamics, and healthcare monitoring. Recently, stringent privacy regulations such as GDPR and CCPA have introduced significant new challenges for existing spatio-temporal graph models, requiring complete unlearning of unauthorized data. Since each node in a spatio-temporal graph diffuses information globally across both spatial and temporal dimensions, existing unlearning methods primarily designed for static graphs and localized data removal cannot efficiently erase a single node without incurring costs nearly equivalent to full model retraining. To address this, we propose CallosumNet, a spatio-temporal graph unlearning framework biologically inspired by the corpus callosum structure. CallosumNet makes two key technical contributions: (1) it reconstructs subgraphs using biologically-inspired virtual edges; and (2) it restores interlinked spatio-temporal dependencies among subgraphs via a lightweight meta-graph integration layer. Empirical results on four diverse real-world datasets show that CallosumNet achieves complete unlearning while maintaining accuracy very close to the gold model. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/wenlu-lab/STGraphUnlearning.

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Safe to Resume? Breaking Execution Continuity of Agent Execution via Rollback

AI agents are moving toward persistent, stateful execution across various applications, accumulating execution state and external effects that are costly to reconstruct after failures. Checkpoint and rollback (C/R) are becoming essential for recovery, yet their security implications remain largely unexplored. Correct rollback does not imply secure recovery: a faithfully restored checkpoint may resume an execution whose states, assumptions, and external effects never coexisted in any valid history. In this paper, we present the first systematic security study of checkpoint and rollback in existing agent systems. By examining representative agent C/R systems, we characterize the design space of existing C/R mechanisms and develop a general execution model that captures their recovery boundaries and state dependencies. From this model, we identify five fundamental failure modes spanning incomplete or inconsistent internal state, stale external dependencies, nondeterministic replay, and unrecorded external effects. We further demonstrate their security impact through three end-to-end attacks on Hermes, Cline, and LangGraph, enabling malware-verification bypass, unauthorized mail forwarding, and double payment. To systematically study these failures in practice, we develop a multi-agent analysis pipeline that reconstructs execution semantics, identifies violations of the five failure conditions, and validates them through actual rollback. Across five representative frameworks, our evaluation shows that these failures recur across heterogeneous C/R designs and stem from a common gap between the state restored by a checkpoint and the dependencies required for secure continuation.

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Benchmark Contamination: A Taxonomy Organized by Defeated Mitigation

A benchmark score is a joint property of the model, the evaluation harness, the elicitation budget, the sampled population, and contamination status. Leaderboards publish the model and the score, so capability and leakage stay observationally equivalent. Existing taxonomies classify contamination for automated detection, not the question a reporter faces at publication: given the mitigations already applied, which validity threats remain open? We introduce a taxonomy organized by the mitigation each type defeats -- direct, derivative, temporal, distributional, and acquired -- spanning training-time and evaluation-time leakage. Holding out a private test set closes the first alone. The fifth is acquired during the evaluation itself; because it is a property of one run, it must be recorded with the reported score rather than with the benchmark release. We operationalize it as a four-field disclosure protocol in which "unknown" is a valid entry, released under CC BY 4.0 with a JSON Schema, a validator, and worked examples. Two coders external to the design team applied a pre-registered instrument to 41 documents. Per-variable linear-weighted $κ$ runs from 0.00 to 0.35 (median 0.21) over 29 main-pass documents against a single-coder test-retest ceiling of 0.84, collapsing under the class skew the registration anticipated; pooling raises it to 0.46 through chance correction rather than better agreement. Two variables fall below the prevalence-robust threshold registered in advance: strata reporting and the acquired type introduced here. Disagreement concentrates on when a variable applies rather than on what a document states. Elicitation budgets are reported in 13% of documents, and no document addresses all five types. The contribution is the taxonomy, the score-side artifact that follows from it, and a pre-registered measurement of instrument reliability and current disclosure.

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Temporal Analysis of NetFlow Datasets for Network Intrusion Detection Systems

This paper investigates the temporal analysis of NetFlow datasets for machine learning (ML)-based network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). Although many previous studies have highlighted the critical role of temporal features, such as inter-packet arrival time and flow length/duration, in NIDS, the currently available NetFlow datasets for NIDS lack these temporal features. This study addresses this gap by creating and making publicly available a set of NetFlow datasets that incorporate these temporal features [1]. With these temporal features, we provide a comprehensive temporal analysis of NetFlow datasets by examining the distribution of various features over time and presenting time-series representations of NetFlow features. This temporal analysis has not been previously provided in the existing literature. We also borrowed an idea from signal processing, time frequency analysis, and tested it to see how different the time frequency signal presentations (TFSPs) are for various attacks. The results indicate that many attacks have unique patterns, which could help ML models to identify them more easily.

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GSPR: Aligning LLM Safeguards as Generalizable Safety Policy Reasoners

As large language models (LLMs) are integrated into numerous applications, LLMs' safety becomes critical for both application developers and intended users. Currently, great efforts have been made to develop safety benchmarks with fine-grained taxonomies. However, these benchmarks' taxonomies are disparate with different safety policies. Thus, existing safeguards trained on these benchmarks are either coarse-grained to only distinguish between "safe'' and "unsafe,'' or constrained by the specified narrow risk taxonomies. To leverage these fine-grained safety policies across multiple safety taxonomies, we propose GSPR, a Generalizable Safety Policy Reasoner to identify unsafe inputs and outputs with violated safety taxonomies and concise explanations. Unlike prior safeguards which only cover a fixed set of risk factors, GSPR incentivizes its reasoning capability with varied safety taxonomies through reinforcement learning. Our GSPR can be trained across multiple safety benchmarks with distinct taxonomies and naturally exhibits powerful generalization ability. We conduct extensive experiments to show that GSPR significantly improves existing safety guardrails' reasoning capabilities for both safety and category prediction tasks. Moreover, GSPR also achieves the least inference token costs with explanations.

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GREAT: Generalizable Backdoor Attacks in RLHF via Emotion-Aware Trigger Synthesis

Recent work has shown that RLHF is highly susceptible to backdoor attacks. However, existing methods often rely on rare tokens or fixed triggers, limiting their impact in realistic scenarios. In this work, we develop GREAT, a novel framework for crafting natural distributional backdoors in RLHF. Specifically, GREAT targets harmful response generation for a vulnerable user subpopulation featured by semantically violent requests paired with emotionally angry triggers. At the core of our framework is a trigger identification pipeline that operates in the model's latent embedding space, leveraging dimensionality reduction and clustering techniques to identify representative triggers. To enable this, we introduce a hierarchical and diversity-driven prompting strategy to construct Erinyes, a high-quality dataset of over 5,000 angry triggers curated from GPT-4.1. Our experiments show that GREAT significantly outperforms baselines in attack generalization to unseen triggers, while preserving standard utility and maintaining stealth under defenses.

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Progressive Behavioral Drift through Compression Valleys in Large Language Models

We show that attention sinks and compression valleys create a vulnerable region in decoder-only Transformers, where small activation perturbations can be amplified through the autoregressive trajectory. Based on this, we propose Sensitivity-Scaled Steering (SSS), a progressive activation-space attack that anchors perturbations at the beginning-of-sequence token and adaptively reinforces them at sensitive layers and tokens. Instead of forcing an abrupt behavioral change, SSS induces a staged drift, making outputs gradually shift toward the target behavior while remaining fluent and benign-looking in early generations. Across multiple open-weight models and four behavioral axes, SSS achieves high attack success, preserves coherence, and causes negligible degradation to general capabilities. These results show that attention sinks and compression valleys are not merely mechanistic features; rather, they expose exploitable amplification mechanisms that can be treated as hidden-state weaknesses for activation-space attacks in white-box and supply-chain LLM deployments.

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More Haste, Less Speed: Weaker Single-Layer Watermark Improves Distortion-Free Watermark Ensembles

Watermarking has emerged as a crucial technique for detecting and attributing content generated by large language models. While recent advancements have utilized watermark ensembles to enhance robustness, prevailing methods typically prioritize maximizing the strength of the watermark at every individual layer. In this work, we identify a critical limitation in this "stronger-is-better" approach: strong watermarks significantly reduce the entropy of the token distribution, which paradoxically weakens the effectiveness of watermarking in subsequent layers. We theoretically and empirically show that detectability is bounded by entropy and that watermark ensembles induce a monotonic decrease in both entropy and the expected green-list ratio across layers. To address this inherent trade-off, we propose a general framework that utilizes weaker single-layer watermarks to preserve the entropy required for effective multi-layer ensembling. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that this counter-intuitive strategy mitigates signal decay and consistently outperforms strong baselines in both detectability and robustness.

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Balancing the privacy-utility trade-off: How to draw reliable conclusions from private data

Absolute anonymization, conceived as an irreversible transformation preventing re-identification and sensitive value disclosure, has proven to be a broken promise. Modern data protection must therefore shift toward a privacy-utility trade-off grounded in risk mitigation. Differential Privacy (DP) offers a rigorous mathematical framework for balancing quantified disclosure risk with analytical usefulness. Nevertheless, widespread adoption remains limited, largely because complex technical concepts, such as privacy-loss parameters, have yet to be translated into forms meaningful to non-technical stakeholders. This difficulty arises from randomization itself: both analysts and adversaries must draw conclusions from uncertain observations rather than deterministic values. In this work, we adopt an interpretation of the privacy-utility trade-off based on hypothesis testing to measure the uncertainty introduced by randomized mechanisms. In particular, we use the concept of relative disclosure risk to quantify the maximum reduction in uncertainty an adversary can obtain from a membership attack on protected outputs, and show this measure relates directly to standard privacy-loss parameters. We further analyze how DP affects analytical validity via its impact on hypothesis tests assessing statistical significance. Building on these results, we provide practical guidance, accessible to non-experts such as data protection authorities, for navigating the trade-off and selecting protection mechanisms and parameter values.

stat.ME↗

ROAST: Risk-aware Outlier-exposure for Adversarial Selective Training of Anomaly Detectors Against Evasion Attacks

Safety-critical domains like healthcare rely on deep neural networks (DNNs) for prediction, yet DNNs remain vulnerable to evasion attacks. Anomaly detectors (ADs) are widely used to protect DNNs, but conventional ADs are trained indiscriminately on benign data from all patients, overlooking physiological differences that introduce noise, degrade robustness, and reduce recall. In this paper, we propose ROAST, a novel risk-aware outlier exposure (OE) selective training framework that improves AD recall while largely preserving precision. ROAST identifies patients who are less vulnerable to attack and focuses training on these cleaner, more reliable data, thereby reducing false negatives and improving recall. To preserve precision, the framework applies OE by injecting adversarial samples into the training set of the less vulnerable patients, avoiding noisy data from others. Experiments show that ROAST increases recall by 16.2\% (black-box attack setting) and 5.89\% (white-box attack setting) on average while reducing the training time by 88.3\% on average compared to indiscriminate training, with minimal impact on precision.

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What's on Your Mind? Exploring Privacy of Mental Health Apps

Therapy and life-coaching apps have grown rapidly in number, variety, and popularity. At the same time, their users often share highly sensitive and personal information, including mental health issues, trauma experiences, fantasies, desires, and relationship difficulties. This prompts the need to examine privacy practices across the ecosystem. In this paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of a corpus of 25 popular Android mental health and life-coaching apps, such as Replika and Headspace. It builds on static analysis and dynamic network traffic analysis, coupled with identifying gaps between each app's observed behavior and its privacy policies. Our analysis highlights serious concerns and substantial transparency gaps. First, every app in our corpus embeds at least one tracker SDK not named in its privacy policy, and 85\% of the apps we instrument fail to disclose at least half of the trackers detected in their APKs. Second, more than half of the apps declare several dangerous permissions without corresponding privacy-policy disclosures, including camera or microphone permissions. Third, nearly half the apps disclose third-party AI processing (e.g., via OpenAI, Anthropic, and Groq) in their privacy policies, while several use only generic language (e.g., "AI services"), failing to identify which company receives user data. Overall, our results show that current disclosure practices fall short of the transparency needed for meaningful informed consent. We argue for a significantly updated regulatory framework for therapy apps that more closely aligns with the professional and ethical standards that bind licensed human therapists.

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Compare source metadata on this page
WorkPublishedSource identifierSource
Auditing and Mitigating Privacy Leakage in Cloud-Edge Collaborative Decoding2026-08-292608.29111arxiv
Not the Same Protector: Deployment-Dependent Protective Intervention in LLMs2026-08-292608.29136arxiv
WoE Wrote It? Watermarking Mixture-of-Experts LLMs for Black-Box Text Provenance2026-08-292608.29151arxiv
GhostSplat: Input-Triggered Backdoors for Multi-View-Consistent 3D Content Manipulation in Feed-Forward Gaussian Splatting2026-08-292608.29184arxiv
A Broadcast Authenticated Encryption with Keyword Search in the Standard Model: Tightly Secure in Multi-User, Multi-Challenge Settings2026-08-292608.29191arxiv
Asymmetric Phase Coding Video Watermarking2026-08-292608.29212arxiv
A Multi-Month Study of Git Commit Signing2026-08-292608.29283arxiv
Unlearning on Spatio-Temporal Graphs through Subgraph Virtual Edge Reconstruction2026-08-292608.29369arxiv
Safe to Resume? Breaking Execution Continuity of Agent Execution via Rollback2026-08-292608.29381arxiv
Benchmark Contamination: A Taxonomy Organized by Defeated Mitigation2026-08-292608.29463arxiv
Temporal Analysis of NetFlow Datasets for Network Intrusion Detection Systems2026-08-282503.04404arxiv
GSPR: Aligning LLM Safeguards as Generalizable Safety Policy Reasoners2026-08-282509.24418arxiv
GREAT: Generalizable Backdoor Attacks in RLHF via Emotion-Aware Trigger Synthesis2026-08-282510.09260arxiv
Progressive Behavioral Drift through Compression Valleys in Large Language Models2026-08-282511.17194arxiv
More Haste, Less Speed: Weaker Single-Layer Watermark Improves Distortion-Free Watermark Ensembles2026-08-282602.11793arxiv
Balancing the privacy-utility trade-off: How to draw reliable conclusions from private data2026-08-282603.12753arxiv
ROAST: Risk-aware Outlier-exposure for Adversarial Selective Training of Anomaly Detectors Against Evasion Attacks2026-08-282603.26093arxiv
What's on Your Mind? Exploring Privacy of Mental Health Apps2026-08-282605.02016arxiv

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