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arXiv · 2611.10224

Jais 3: Introducing Arabic-centric Agentic AI

Abstract

We present Jais 3, a fleet of six open, Arabic-centric agentic language models ranging from 0.9B to 375B parameters. Jais 3 is built to complete tasks for Arabic speakers, not only to answer questions in plain text: it is trained to plan multi-step tasks, call tools and Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, operate a terminal, search the web, and read, edit, and produce PDF, spreadsheet, and presentation files, while communicating with the user in Arabic. Instead of pretraining from scratch, we adapt each model of the fully open K2 Horizon fleet to Arabic through continual pretraining, followed by supervised fine-tuning (SFT), final token preference optimization (FTPO), and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). We combine natural Arabic text with translated, transliterated, and synthetic Arabic, and replay the base model's own training data to keep its reasoning, agentic, and English abilities. Jais 3 covers Modern Standard Arabic and the major regional dialects, follows instructions with Arabic-specific constraints, and inherits the 512K-token context window of K2 Horizon (all models except the 0.9B). To our knowledge, its 375B model is the largest open Arabic-centric language model to date. For evaluation, we revisit how Arabic models are assessed, moving to fully generative evaluation on audited Arabic benchmarks. Across model sizes, Jais 3 matches or outperforms open-weight models of comparable size on Arabic and agentic benchmarks, with particularly strong agentic capabilities and Arabic instruction following, and far fewer hallucinations. We release the weights and the checkpoints from every training stage of all six models, together with samples of the training data, the data recipes and training configurations, the training logs, the audited benchmarks, and the evaluation code.

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Team IFM, Haonan Li, Hadi Abdine, Nikhil Ranjan, Mohamed Anwar, Ahmad Chamma, Amr Mohamed, Ahmed Frikha, Dani Bouch, Maaz Maqsood, George Ibrahim, Mostafa Awad, Nurkhan Laiyk, Hasan Iqbal, Abhishek Maiti, Bilal Bouardi, Shivam Chauhan, Ahmer Tabassum, Owais Aijaz, Omar Arbi, Neha Sengupta, Aaryamonvikram Singh, Abdelhakim Freihat, Sarath Chandran, Rahul Pal, Mohammed Bellam, Sajid Siddiki, Sarah AlBarri, Debopriyo Banerjee, Ali El Filali, Samta Kamboj, Rifo Genadi, Ahmed Attia, Go Inoue, Shuonan Dong, Amine Khelif Khelif, Evan Dufraisse, Florian Valade, Tapas Sen, Guowei He, Sunil Sahu, Onkar Pandit, Kareem Magdy, Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, Samujjwal Ghosh, Zainul Abedien Ahmed Quraishi, Larry Murray, Avraham Sheinin, Natalia Vassilieva, Preslav Nakov, Guokan Shang, Xuguang Hector Ren, Zhengzhong Liu, Eric Xing. 2026-11-12. Jais 3: Introducing Arabic-centric Agentic AI. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2611.10224

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